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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ECONOMIC DUE PROCESS AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN
CALIFORNIA
The right to work and earn a living is fundamental in the sense that it
falls within the protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment,1 and its counterpart in state constitutions.2 Under the police power
of the states, economic affairs may be regulated in the interest of protecting
the public health, welfare, morals, and safety.3 Substantive due process acts
as a general limitation on the police power by requiring that the legislative
enactment be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.*
During the first three decades of the century, the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court displayed a marked tendency to declare state statutes
regulating economic affairs unconstitutional as violations of the substantive
commands of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 In some
of the earlier cases of this period, the Court invalidated state laws out of
concern for freedom of enterprise and improper legislative motives.6 In the
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No state . . . shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." In Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41
(1915), the Court said: "It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a
living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure."
2 CAL. CoNsT. art I, § 13: "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law." See Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 749, 155 P.2d
343, 345 (1944): "The right to work, either in employment or independent business, is
fundamental and, no doubt, enjoys the protection of the personal liberty guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, as well as the more specific provi-
sions of our state Constitution."
3 Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 Pac. 381, 383 (1925),
where the court said:
In its inception the police power was connected with the preservation of
the public peace, safety, morals, and health without specific regard for "the
general welfare." The increasing complexity of our civilization and institutions
later gave rise to cases wherein the promotion of the public welfare was held by
the courts to be a legitimate object for the exercise of the police power. As our
civil life has developed, so has the definition of "public welfare" until it has
been held to embrace regulations "to promote the economic welfare, public
convenience, and general prosperity of the community."
4Larson v. Bush, 29 Cal. App. 2d 43, 46, 83 P.2d 955, 956 (1938): "The limitations
on this power are that the regulations cannot be arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreason-
able."
5 See generally, McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court, SuPRnRM
CoURT Evmv 34 (1962); Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive
Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 13-32, 226-51 (1958).
6 E.g., see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of
this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the police power for
the purpose of protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed
from other motives. We are justified in saying so when, from the character of
the law and the subject upon which it legislates, it is apparent that the public
health or welfare bears but the most remote relation to the law.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes criticized the practice of reading the
economic theory of laissez faire into the Constitution: "But a constitution is not intended
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later cases of the period, however, the Court turned to a more moderate
approach in which it weighed the expected benefits for the public against
the restrictions on the individual, and gave consideration to reasonable
alternatives.
7
In the late nineteen thirties, the Supreme Court abandoned both the
more extreme and the moderate approaches to economic due process.8 Justice
Stone, writing for the Court in 1938,1 stated the principle which has been
adhered to since, that judicial inquiries "where the legislative judgment is
drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts
either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it.",0
As a practical matter, this principle operates to raise a strong presumption of
constitutionality." It is a rare statute which does not have a single rational
argument in its favor, and once this is established, judicial inquiry ceases
although the law may have many useless and wasteful aspects.
Although the Supreme Court has said it no longer sits as a "super-legis-
lature"'12 over state economic regulation, the doctrine of economic due proc-
ess continues to enjoy a vigorous life in the states.1 3 California early aligned
itself with the federal position. In 1936, the California Supreme Court up-
to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation
of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire." Id. at 75.
7 See Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926), where the fact that a rea-
sonable alternative method was available entailing less deprivation was a factor the court
considered in invalidating a statute prohibiting the use of shoddy in the manufacture of
mattresses. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
8 The case of Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), is generally regarded as
the precursor for the withdrawal. In the field of price regulation, earlier federal decisions
had held that the states could regulate prices only in businesses "affected with a public
interest," a phrase which was narrowly construed to include only businesses in the nature
of public utilities. The Court in the Nebbia case discarded this restriction, saying, "The
phrase 'affected with a public interest' can, in the nature of things mean no more than
that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good." Id. at
536. The traditional economic due process cases began to topple soon afterward. The
most notable cases were: West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and upholding minimum wage regu-
lation; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277
U.S. 350 (1928), and upholding regulation of employment agency rates.
9 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
10 Id. at 154 (emphasis added). For more recent cases applying this principle see
Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
11 Hetherington, supra note 5, at 32, describes it as an almost conclusive presump-
tion of validity. It is significant that not since 1938 has the Supreme Court declared a
statute regulating commercial matters unconstitutional on due process grounds.
12 "Our recent decisions make it plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to
weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses
offends public welfare." Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
13 See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MENN.
L. REv. 91 (1950). See also Comment, Substantive Due Process in the States Revisited,
18 Ono ST. L.J. 384 (1957), a sequel to Professor Paulsen's article; Note, Counterrevolu-
tion in State Constitutional Law, 15 STAN. L. REv. 309 (1963).
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held the Fair Trade Act 4 and shortly thereafter, the Unfair Practices Act.'9
The language and tenor of these cases manifest that it is primarily a legis-
lative and not a judicial function to determine economic policy, and that
the court would be reluctant to invoke economic due process to declare
legislation unconstitutional.6
The only case to cast doubt on California's position on economic due
process is State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux,1" decided in 1953, in
which the minimum price provisions of the Dry Cleaners Act 8 were invali-
dated. The act established a board which, upon petition of seventy-five
per cent or more of the dry cleaners from a given area, was empowered to
conduct a survey to determine minimum costs necessary to "enable cleaners,
dyers, or pressers in that city or county or other area to furnish modern,
proper, healthful and sanitary services, using modem appliances and equip-
ment so as to minimize the danger to public health and safety incident to
such services.": ' 9 The court concluded that the objective of the act was not
the purported one of promotion of public health and safety, since other stat-
utes regulating the industry, such as those for fire protection and workman's
safety, provided adequate health and safety protection.20 The court refused
to accept a reasonable alternative purpose (prevention of injurious compe-
tition) because the statute "in no way purports to prevent destructive and
unfair competition or to suppress violence."2' The court then turned to the
public welfare aspect of the act and resurrected the case of In re Kazas.22
In Kazas, the district court of appeal had invalidated a city ordinance regu-
lating barber prices because barbering was not a business "affected with a
public interest." Thus armed with the "affected with a public interest" ra-
tionale, the court in Thrift-D-Lux concluded: "The effect of the statute here
involved is to protect the industry only-a small segment of the general
public."23
In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Justice Traynor argued that there was
a rational basis for the act in that there had been a history of destructive
and ruthless competition in the dry cleaning business, resulting in a down-
grading of services essential to the public health.24
An interesting analysis can be made of a 1963 district court of appeal
14 CaL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16900-05, upheld in Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman,
5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936), aff'd 299 U.S. 198 (1936).
'5 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-101, upheld in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers
Bureau v. National Candy & Gum Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 (1938).
See also, Jersey Maid Milk Prods. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939);
People v. Ryan, 101 Cal. App. 2d 927, 226 P.2d 376 (1951). But see Whitcomb v.
Emerson, 46 Cal. App. 2d 263, 115 P.2d 892 (1941).
"740 Cal. 2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953).
18 Formerly CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 9560-67, added by Cal. Stat. 1945, ch.
1517 § 1, p. 2847, repealed by Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1691 § 11, p. 306 (as to §§ 9560,
9562-67) and Cal. Stat. 1953, ch. 838 § 1, p. 2156 (as to § 9561).
19 Formerly CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9564 (see supra note 18).
20 40 Cal. 2d at 441, 254 P.2d at 32.
21 Ibid.
2222 Cal. App. 2d 161, 70 P.2d 962 (1937).
23 40 Cal. 2d at 447, 254 P.2d at 35.
24 Id. at 450, 254 P.2d at 37.
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decision, Doyle v. Board of Barber Examiners.25 Prior to 1957, Business and
Professions Code section 6550 provided in effect that apprentice barbers
26
were to be employed at a ratio of one apprentice to every two registered
barbers employed in a barbershop. In 1957 this section was amended to
provide that each shop could employ "one apprentice to each registered
barber working in the shop but not to exceed two apprentices in each shop."
27
The appellant barbershop owner had employed three apprentices in his
shop and as a result his license was suspended for violating the 1957 statute.
He petitioned for a writ of mandate to annul the suspension on the ground
that it violated the due process clause of the California and federal consti-
tutions.
The court found that there were factors having a rational relation to the
public interest, which the legislature might have considered when enacting
the statute. Such factors were that limiting the number of apprentices to two
permitted shop owners to personally supervise the training of apprentices.
The reasoning was that if there were more than two apprentices in the shop,
much of each apprentice's supervision would come from employee-barbers
who would not be as assiduous to teach and correct an apprentice as would a
shop owner. Thus, the statute insures that the apprentice will complete his
training as a competent practitioner because he will have the benefit of super-
vision by the shop owner rather than the employee-barber. Secondly, there
were seventeen other states which had statutes similar to the one in Califor-
nia.28 Thirdly, the court on its own motion raised the point that the legisla-
ture might have passed the regulation to prevent exploitation of the public.
The court pointed out that since most people do not know whether their hair
is being cut by an apprentice or a journeyman, limiting the number of ap-
prentices to two per shop provides the public with some assurance of jour-
neyman service without eliminating on-the-job training.
A close analysis reveals that the reasons advanced by the court for up-
holding the statute are tenuous. The fact that seventeen other states have
similar regulations is circumstantial evidence of reasonableness, but in none
of the enumerated states has the constitutionality of the regulation been
litigated. The argument that the statute might have been passed to give
the public some assurance of journeyman service seems reasonable on the
surface. But does the two apprentice restriction correct this evil? The legis-
lature could prevent an owner from disguising his apprentices as journey-
men much more effectively by requiring a posted notice identfiying the
apprentice, or perhaps by requiring all apprentices to wear green arm bands.
The fact that more direct and efficient alternatives are available or possible
25219 A.C.A. 576, 33 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1963). Letter to this writer from counsel for
appellant, Edward P. Friedberg, December 5, 1963: "Please be advised we did not
appeal the matter further and the decision is final."
26 CAL. Bus. & PnOF. CODE § 6550: "No registered apprentice may independently
practice barbering, but he may as an apprentice do any or all of the acts constituting
the practice of barbering under the immediate personal supervision and employment of
a registered barber .. "
27Amended by Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 351 § 1, p. 994 (emphasis added).
2 Fla., Ida., Kan., La., Me., Mich., Minn., N.J., N.M., Ore., Ohio, Okla., Pa., R.I.,
Tenn., Wis., Wyo.
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has shaped decisions in the past. 9
The only theory advanced by the court which is at all persuasive, is that
the limitation permitted the shop owners to supervise the training of appren-
tices. By limiting the permissible number to two, the legislature assured each
apprentice of obtaining adequate supervision from the shop owner, who is
presumably more concerned and interested in his training than are employee-
barbers. In light of the liberal economic due process doctrine, the court did
not go further. It did not consider whether limiting the number of appren-
tices would actually result in closer supervision by the employer. The result-
ing economic discrimination against large shop owners, who must hire more
journeymen in proportion to total employees than the small shop owner,
was not considered. Nor was it mentioned that the statute tends to protect
journeymen from job displacement by apprentices. 30 The court concluded:
"If the judicial arm stops swinging upon postulation of any rationally accept-
able hypothesis for the statute... there is little elbow room for balancing
private burdens against public benefits. The process stops as soon as any
public benefit is hypothesized."1 So sweeping is this statement that under
it only the most preposterous of statutes would fall. Surely there are statutes
short of being preposterous and yet so burdensome and restrictive that they
should be invalidated. The provision invalidated in the Thrift-D-Lux case
would seem to be such a statute. It is especially significant that in Thrift-D-
Lux the court relied on the older approach of carefully scrutinizing the stat-
ute and weighing the benefits against the burdens.
Although the contours of the California concept of economic due process
cannot be precisely determined, there appears to be a close kinship to the
federal position.3 2 As said in the Doyle case: "[Tihe . . . law may exact a
needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the legislature,
not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new re-
29 See supra note 7. This is essentially what was done in the Thrift-D-Lux case,
where it was indicated that when other statutes meet the need which the legislation in
question purports to meet, the ostensible purpose of the statute will at least be suspect.
See also, Edwards v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 P.2d 450 (1951),
where it was found that other statutes were adequate to guard against the health men-
aces of barbershops, and therefore a statute fixing barbering prices could not be upheld
on that basis.
30 The court did take judicial notice of statistical records compiled by the Board
of Barber Examiners demonstrating that the number of registered barbershops in Cali-
fornia exceeds the number of registered apprentices, as proof that the two-apprentice
limitation is "not an actual limitation on the total number of barber apprentices in Cali-
fornia." 219 A.C.A. at 588, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 357. It could be argued, however, that
these statistics disregard the factor that many shops may, as a matter of policy, not hire
apprentices.
31219 A.C.A. at 587, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
32 The case of Serve Yourself Gasoline Stations Ass'n v. Brock, 39 Cal. 2d 813, 249
P.2d 545 (1952), decided a few months before Thrift-D-Lux, appeared consistent with
the early attitude of the court. Decisions subsequent to Thrift-D-Lux are also consistent
with the early attitude. See Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d
881, 291 P.2d 936 (1955); Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol, 53 Cal. 2d 141, 346 P.2d 737 (1959). But cf. Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Ex-
aminers, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101 (1962).
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